October 25th, 1944. Philippine Sea, east of Samar Island. The binoculars trembled slightly in Enen William Brooks’s hands as he peered down from his Grumman TBF Avenger at 1,500 ft above the gray waters, recording words into his radio that would freeze the blood of every man in task unit 77.4.3. Those are not our ships. From his vantage point on routine anti-ubmarine patrol launched from escort carrier USS St. Low, he had just witnessed something that contradicted every assumption about where the Japanese fleet was supposed to be.

Pagod masts rising from the horizon in the dim light of early morning. The distinctive profile of the largest battleship ever constructed, cutting through patches of mist, an entire armada of heavy cruisers and battleships steaming at full speed directly towards six small escort carriers that possessed nothing capable of stopping them. Rear Admiral Clifton AF Sprag, commanding officer of task unit 77.4.3, had been assured that the powerful third fleet under Admiral William F. Pauly protected his northern flank. The San Bernardino straight between Luzon and Samar was supposedly blocked by American battleships.

Yet here, materializing out of the early morning haze at 0637, came the full might of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s center force. four battleships including Yamato, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11 destroyers against six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. The mathematics of naval warfare were being rewritten not in tactical manuals, but in decisions that would have to be made in the next 60 seconds. The impossible had occurred, and the response would trigger one of the most audacious actions in naval history when tiny destroyers and destroyer escorts charged battleships in a suicide run that should never have succeeded.

The road to this moment began months earlier as American forces advanced relentlessly across the Pacific. By October 1944, the liberation of the Philippines had become strategically inevitable. American forces invaded Ley Island on October 20th, threatening to cut Japan’s access to the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies and the rubber plantations of Southeast Asia. Without those resources flowing northward, the Japanese Empire’s war machine would strangle within months. The Imperial Japanese Navy understood this existential threat. They devised Operation Shogo 1, Victory Operation 1, a complex three-pronged attack designed to destroy the American invasion fleet anchored in Laty Gulf.

The plan was brilliant in conception, requiring precise coordination between three separate naval forces converging from different directions. Vice Admiral Jizaburo Ozawa would lead the northern force southward from Japan. His force consisted of four aircraft carriers, but these flattops were shells of their former power. The carriers Zuikaku, Zuiho, Chitos, and Chioda, embarked barely 100 aircraft total, with pilots so inexperienced that many could barely land on carriers. This force existed solely as bait to lure Admiral Holse’s powerful third fleet away from Lady Gulf.

Ozawa understood his mission was sacrificial. His carriers would draw Holsey northward while the real killing blow came from elsewhere. Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura would bring the southern force northward through Surria Strait from the south. His battleships Yamashiro and Fusso, heavy cruiser Magami and four destroyers would strike the invasion fleet from below. and Vice Admiral Teao Kurita would command the center force, the most powerful element through the San Bernardino Strait to strike directly at the vulnerable transport ships in Lady Gulf.

The center force represented the cream of what remained of Japanese naval power after 3 years of attrition warfare. The super battleship Yamato displaced 72,800 tons and carried 9 18.1 in guns, the largest naval guns ever mounted on a warship. Each gun could fire a 3,220 lb armor-piercing shell over 26 mi with devastating accuracy. Her sister ship Mousashi sailed alongside her, an identical floating fortress that had never suffered a scratch in combat. Battleships Nagato, Congo, and Haruna added their 14in and 16in guns to the formation.

10 heavy cruisers provided devastating mid-range firepower. A targetgo, Takao, Maya, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Tone, and Chikuma. Each mounted eight or 10 8-in guns capable of destroying any American ship smaller than a battleship. Light cruisers Noshiro and Yahagi screened the formation with their rapid fire 6-in batteries. 11 destroyers completed the force. On paper, Operation Shogo 1 appeared brilliant, but American submarines had already begun its unraveling before the plan fully deployed. On October 23rd, submarines USS Darta and USS Dace patrolled the Palawan Passage west of the Philippines when their sonar operators detected Karita’s force transiting toward Lee.

Commander David Mcclintok in Dart and Commander Bladen Claget in Dace coordinated a textbook attack. At dawn on October 23rd, they struck. Dart’s torpedoes slammed into heavy cruiser Atarago, Kurita’s flagship. The massive explosions tore the cruiser apart. At Targetgo sank in 18 minutes, taking 360 men with her. Vice Admiral Kurita was forced to abandon his flagship and swim for his life in sharkinfested waters before being rescued by destroyer Kishinami. The psychological impact of nearly drowning while his command exploded around him would haunt Karita’s decision-making 48 hours later off summer.

Dart’s second torpedo spread hit heavy cruiser Takao, blowing off her stern and flooding her engineering spaces. Though Takao survived, she was crippled and forced to limp back to Brunai, escorted by two destroyers, removing three ships from Karita’s force. Dace torpedoed heavy cruiser Mer which exploded spectacularly and sank in minutes. In the span of 1 hour, American submarines had sunk two heavy cruisers, crippled a third, and nearly killed the Japanese commander. Karita transferred his flag to Yamato and pressed eastward despite the losses.

The plan required his arrival at Lady Gulf at dawn on October 25th. There was no time to reorganize or reconsider. The following day, October 24th, brought catastrophe. American carrier aircraft from Admiral Holsey’s third fleet located Karita’s force transiting the Sibuan Sea in the central Philippines. Wave after wave of dive bombers and torpedo planes attacked throughout the afternoon. The super battleship Mousashi became the focus of the American assault. Over four hours, Mousashi absorbed punishment that would have sunk any other warship afloat.

American pilots reported hitting her with 19 torpedoes and 17 bomb hits, though Japanese sources recorded 11 torpedoes and 10 bombs. The exact count remains debated, but the result was indisputable. At 1935, on October 24th, Mousashi capsized and sank, taking over 1,000 men with her. Her sister ship Yamato would arrive at Samar the next morning without her. Kurita’s force took such punishment in the Cibuan Sea that he temporarily reversed course westward around 1500, appearing to retreat. American pilots reported the center force as heavily damaged and retiring from the battle.

Admiral Holsey, reading these reports aboard his flagship USS New Jersey, made the fateful decision that would leave Lady Gulf’s northern flank exposed. That same evening, Holsey received reports of Azawa’s carrier force approaching from the north. The bait dangled before him proved irresistible. Carriers represented the decisive weapon of Pacific naval warfare. the instruments that had won at Coral Sea and Midway that had devastated Japanese bases from Rabul to Tru. A chance to destroy the remnants of Japan’s carrier force could not be ignored.

Holly took his entire third fleet, including all six of his fast battleships and eight fleet carriers with their escorts and raced north at maximum speed to destroy Ozawa’s force. He left no ships to guard the San Bernardino Strait. More critically, he failed to clearly communicate this decision to Admiral Thomas C. Conincaid, commander of the seventh fleet responsible for protecting the Laty invasion. Holly had sent a preparatory dispatch about forming task force 34, a powerful battleship group under Admiral Willis Lee to guard the strait.

But this was merely a contingency plan, not an executed order. Through a series of miscommunications and assumptions, Concincaid believed Task Force 34 had been detached and was guarding San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Chester Nimmits in Pearl Harbor read the same dispatches and made the same assumption. No such force existed. The San Bernardino Strait lay open and completely unguarded. Kurita, having reorganized his battered force after Mousashi’s loss, reversed course again after nightfall and steamed eastward. At 00035 on October 25th, his force passed through San Bernardino Straight unopposed.

Not a single American ship or aircraft observed the passage. The center force had been reduced but remained formidable. Four battleships led by Yamato. Six heavy cruisers Chokai, Jikuma, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, and Tony. Light cruisers Noshiro and Yahagi. And 11 destroyers now headed south along the eastern coast of Samar Island toward the completely undefended American landing beaches. Between Karita’s overwhelming firepower and General Douglas MacArthur’s 130,000 vulnerable troops ashore stood only three small task units of escort carriers. These escort carriers designated by radio call signs Taffy 1, Taffy 2, and Taffy 3 were never designed for surface combat.

Built on merchant ship hulls at Kaiser shipyards in Vancouver, Washington, they were slow, lightly armed, and unarmored. Their purpose was providing close air support for troops ashore and conducting anti-ubmarine patrols. The carriers mounted a single 5-in gun for self-defense and several dozen 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft weapons. Their aircraft carried bombs and rockets meant for Japanese bunkers and trucks, not armor-piercing weapons for naval combat. The carriers themselves had maximum speeds of 18 knots, barely faster than the merchant ships from which they were converted.

Japanese cruisers could sustain 30 knots, meaning they would close range inexorably regardless of American maneuvering. Taffy 3, the northernmost unit positioned closest to San Bernardino Strait, was commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton AFsprag. The 48-year-old career officer was known as Ziggy to distinguish him from Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprag, no relation, commanding Taffy 190 mi to the south. Ziggy Sprag’s force consisted of six Casablanca class escort carriers displacing 7,800 tons each, about 50,000 tons combined. USS Fansaw Bay, hull number CVE70, served as flagship.

USS St. CVE63, USS White Plains CVE66, USS Kinan Bay CVE68, USS Kitkun Bay CVE71 and USS Gambia Bay CVE73 completed the carrier contingent. Each carrier embarked approximately 28 aircraft divided between FM2 Wildcat fighters. improved versions of the obsolescent F4F Wildcat and TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. Total aircraft strength for Taffy three numbered approximately 165 planes, equivalent to two fleet carriers, but with pilots trained primarily for ground support missions rather than naval combat. Screening these carriers were seven small warships collectively designated the small boys, a term of endearment that reflected both their size and their crews affection for ships designed for unglamorous escort duty.

Three Fletcher class destroyers provided the heavier punch. USS Johnston DD557, USS Hull DD533, and USS Herman DD532. Each displaced 2,100 tons fully loaded and carried five single 5-in guns in enclosed turrets. These weapons fired 54-lb shells to ranges of 18,000 yd under ideal conditions, though effective range against moving targets was considerably less. Their main anti-ship weapons were 10 21-in torpedo tubes in two quintuple mounts carrying Mark 15 torpedoes with 825lb warheads and ranges of 10,000 yd at 46 knots.

Four John C. Butler class destroyer escorts completed the screen. USS Samuel B. Roberts DE413, USS Dennis D45, USS John C. Butler DE339 and USS Raymond DE341 displaced only 1,350 tons each and mounted just two 5-in guns without the sophisticated fire control systems of the larger destroyers. They carried three torpedo tubes adequate for anti-ubmarine work but minimal for surface combat. These tiny ships had been designed primarily for convoy escort and anti-ubmarine warfare, not surface combat against battleships whose armor belts were thicker than the destroyer escorts entire hulls.

At 0637 on the morning of October 25th, 1944, Enen William C. Brooks spotted the approaching Japanese force during his routine anti-ubmarine patrol. The pre-dawn sky showed the dirty yellow gray hue typical of tropical mornings with broken clouds at 1,500 ft and visibility about 20 mi interrupted by occasional rain squalls. Brooks had launched from Saint Low at 0605 as part of the combat air patrol and anti-ubmarine sweep. His orders were routine. Patrol a sector 20 mi north and west of Taffy 3.

watch for submarines and report anything unusual. At 6:37, something very unusual appeared on the northern horizon. Brooks descended to investigate and radioed his initial report. Ships bearing 240° estimate four battleships, seven cruisers, 11 destroyers. Rear Admiral Sprag received the initial report with disbelief bordering on irritation. Some screwy young aviator reporting part of our own forces, he muttered to his staff on Fanshaw Bay’s flag bridge. The identification must be mistaken. Those had to be Admiral Holse’s battleships from Task Force 34.

Everyone knew Task Force 34 was guarding San Bernardino Strait. Sprag ordered Brooks to verify his identification. 3 minutes later at 6:40, Brooks confirmed his sighting with words that made Sprag’s blood run cold. I can see Pagoda masts. I see the biggest meatball flag on the biggest battleship I ever saw. There was no mistaking those distinctive pagod style superructures. Those were Japanese battleships, and they were heading directly toward Taffy 3 at high speed. At 0645, lookouts on the escort carriers spotted anti-aircraft bursts on the northwestern horizon as the Japanese ships engaged Brooks Lone Avenger with their anti-aircraft batteries.

Moments later, colored splashes began erupting around the carriers as Japanese ships opened fire with ranging shots. The Japanese used different colored dyes in their shells to allow spotters to identify which ship was scoring hits. Red, green, yellow, and blue splashes began walking toward the American carriers. One officer later described it as a deadly rainbow advancing across the water. The brilliant hues created beautiful but terrifying fountains as shells weighing hundreds of pounds detonated on impact with the sea.

At 0646, Yamato fired her first salvo from maximum range. The nine 18.1in guns hurled 9 tons of steel and explosive toward the small American carriers. Sprag faced an impossible tactical situation with no good options. His carriers could not outrun the Japanese force. Even coaxing 19 knots from engines designed for 18. The carriers would be overtaken within 2 hours at most. His 5-in guns could not penetrate battleship or cruiser armor. The destroyer’s guns could damage cruiser superructures but not sink them.

His aircraft were armed for ground support missions with generalurpose bombs and rockets, not armor-piercing bombs or torpedoes. The torpedo bombers carried Mark1 13 aerial torpedoes, but most had already expended them on dawn strikes against shore targets. The nearest American heavy ships capable of challenging Karita belonged to Admiral Jesse Oldenorf’s bombardment group 90 mi to the south. Those battleships had just finished annihilating the Japanese southern force in a night battle at Surria Strait and had depleted most of their armor-piercing ammunition.

They could not reach Samar for hours, even at maximum speed. Admiral Holsey’s third fleet was 300 m to the north pursuing Ozawa’s carriers. Even if recalled immediately, Holse battleships needed 6 hours to reach Samar. Sprag had perhaps 15 minutes before Japanese shells found their range and began systematically destroying his carriers. Yet in those minutes, he formulated a response that would become a masterclass in naval tactics against overwhelming odds. First, he ordered all carriers to launch every available aircraft immediately.

Pilots scrambled to their planes, still wearing pajamas or shorts. Engines turned over before pre-flight checks were complete, and planes roared off carrier decks armed with whatever ordinance happened to be loaded. Some carried depth charges meant for submarines. Others carried generalurpose bombs for shore bombardment. Some launched with empty wings, their pilots intending to make dry runs to distract Japanese gunners. Second, Sprag turned his formation eastsoutheast toward a rain squall his radar operator had spotted 5 mi ahead. The weather would partially mask his ships and by precious minutes.

Third, he ordered maximum speed from his carriers. Engineering crews pushed boilers beyond their design limits, coaxing every possible revolution from turbines never intended for sustained combat speeds. Fourth, Sprag commanded his escorts to generate smoke. The destroyers and destroyer escorts carried chemical smoke generators that could produce thick artificial fog banks. Combined with black funnel smoke from the carrier’s overheated boilers, the smoke would create a dense screen between the carriers and Japanese optical rangefinders. At 650, Sprag transmitted an uncoded radio message on all frequencies.

Under attack by Japanese cruiser force of four battleships, seven cruisers at position 11° 46 minutes north, 126° 20 minutes east. Request immediate assistance. The clear text broadcast, violating normal radio security, was received by every American naval unit in the Philippines and triggered immediate panic in multiple headquarters. Admiral King Cade, still engaged with the remnants of the southern force, realized with horror that no American heavy ships protected the northern approach. Admiral Holsey, 300 m north of Cape Eno, engaging Ozawa’s carriers, received Sprag’s call with equal horror, but relief would take hours to arrive.

Taffy 3 had only minutes. At 0701, the first Japanese Salvos began landing among the carriers. The scale of the incoming fire defied comprehension for men who had spent the war providing close air support and hunting submarines. Yamato’s 18.1 in guns fired shells weighing 3,220 lb projectiles heavier than a compact automobile. Heavy cruiser 8-in guns fired 260lb shells designed specifically to gut unarmored targets like escort carriers. Battleship Congo’s 14-in guns added their weight to the barrage. Against this onslaught, the carrier’s thin steel hulls, a fraction of an inch thick in places, offered no protection whatsoever.

A single large caliber hit could gut an escort carrier from stem to stern. Multiple hits would sink one within minutes. Sprag’s ships zigzagged frantically using a tactic called chasing splashes. Officers directing the ship’s maneuvers watched where shells landed and immediately steered toward those spots, gambling that Japanese gunners would not fire twice at the same location. This desperate improvisation actually worked more often than not. Japanese gunners trained to lead targets moving in straight lines struggled to adjust for American ships constantly changing course toward their previous shell impacts.

Shells that should have struck home instead screamed past bow or stern, missing by yards. But some found their marks. White planes took a direct hit that fortunately failed to explode, the armor-piercing shell passing completely through her thin hull and out the other side. Kinen Bay was straddled repeatedly near misses, sending geysers of water cascading across her flight deck and jamming her rudder temporarily. The rain squall provided temporary reprieve at 0706. For 10 precious minutes, Taffy 3 steamed through torrential rain that reduced visibility to less than 1,000 yd.

The Japanese guns fell temporarily silent, unable to see their targets through the deluge. Officers and crew used those minutes to organize damage control parties, prepare abandoned ship stations, and say prayers. Many men believed they would not survive the next hour, but they remained at their stations, determined to sell their lives dearly. As Taffy 3 emerged from the squall at 0716, the tactical situation had worsened dramatically. Karita’s force, faster than the American carriers, had closed the range by several miles during the chase.

Colored splashes now erupted all around the carriers with frightening accuracy. Near misses sent shrapnel sleeting across flight decks. Direct hits were inevitable. Sprag made the decision that would define the battle and save his carriers. At 0716, he ordered the destroyers to conduct a torpedo attack against the Japanese force. Without waiting for detailed instructions, Commander Ernest E. Evans of USS Johnston had already charged toward the enemy. At 0710, 6 minutes before receiving Sprag’s order, Evans had independently turned Johnston northward and begun his attack run.

Evans was Cherokee and Creek Indian from Oklahoma, proud of his heritage and fearless to the point of recklessness in combat. His features reflected his Native American ancestry, earning him the nickname the Chief among his crew, though never to his face. At Johnston’s commissioning ceremony on October 27th, 1943, exactly 1 year and 2 days before the Battle of Sama, Evans had addressed his assembled crew with words that became legendary. This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend to go in harm’s way, and anyone who doesn’t want to go along had better get off right now.

Not a single sailor requested transfer. Evans had spent the intervening year training Johnston to an edge so sharp that his crew could execute complex maneuvers by instinct. Gunnery drills were conducted daily. Damage control parties practiced constantly. Every officer and enlisted man cross-trained on multiple stations. Now Evans pointed his ship toward the heart of the Japanese formation and ordered flank speed. Johnston’s turbines screamed as she accelerated past 35 knots, racing toward ships that outweighed her 50 to1. The range when Johnston began her run was approximately 35,000 yd, over 17 nautical miles.

Her Mark 15 torpedoes had an effective range of 10,000 yd, just under 6 mi. To launch, Evans would have to penetrate to point blank range in naval terms, closing through 17 miles of heavy gunfire from dozens of enemy weapons. Johnston’s crew laid chemical smoke as she charged, generating a thick artificial fog that partially obscured her from Japanese optical rangefinders, but smoke could not stop shells. At 0707, Johnston engaged Japanese heavy cruiser Kumano with her five 5-in guns at maximum range.

The Mark 37 fire control director linked to a Mark 1A computer gave American destroyers a devastating advantage in gunnery accuracy. While Japanese optical rangefinders struggled with smoke, rain, and rapidly changing ranges, Johnston’s radar painted perfect firing solutions continuously updated in real time. Johnston’s shells began hitting Kumano repeatedly. The American destroyer’s 54-lb projectiles could not penetrate the cruiser’s armored belt, 4 to 5 in of hardened steel protecting her vitals, but they could devastate her superructure and upper works, where thinner armor and numerous flammable materials created vulnerabilities.

Over the next 10 minutes, Johnston fired over 200 main battery rounds at Kumano. An astonishing rate of fire maintained through superbly trained gun crews working in perfect coordination. At least 45 shells struck the heavy cruiser, starting multiple fires and devastating her bridge and fire control stations. Kumano’s top side became a hell of exploding shells and burning metal. Her communications were severed. Her fire control was disrupted. Though her engines remained functional and her main battery intact, Kumano’s ability to fight effectively was severely degraded.

At 0720, having closed to 10,300 yd, Evans launched Johnston’s entire spread of 10 torpedoes. The weapons stre at 46 knots, leaving phosphorescent wakes pointing directly back at their launcher. One torpedo, possibly two, slammed into Kumano’s bow. The explosions tore off the entire front section of the cruiser from the bow to the forward turret. Kumano’s speed dropped immediately to 8 knots as water flooded her forward compartments through the massive hole where her bow had been. She turned away from the battle, escorted by heavy cruiser Suzuya detailed to protect the crippled ship, removing two major Japanese units from the fight at the critical opening phase of the battle.

Johnston had accomplished what seemed impossible. A 2,100 ton destroyer had crippled a 13,000 ton heavy cruiser armed with 10 8-in guns, each of which individually outweighed Johnston’s entire main battery. But victory came at a terrible and immediate price. At 0730, as Johnston turned to hide in her own smoke, Yamato fired a full nine gun salvo at what her fire control station had identified as an American light cruiser. The Japanese had mistaken Johnston for a much larger ship based on her aggressive attack and the heavy damage she had inflicted on Kumano.

From 20,300 yds away, over 9 nautical miles, Yamato’s optical rangefinders had acquired Johnston with deadly accuracy. Three 18.1 in shells struck Johnston almost simultaneously. The first hit below the waterline aft, penetrating the destroyer’s unarmored hull as easily as a rifle bullet through paper. The explosion tore into the after engine room, rupturing steam lines and flooding compartments. Scalding steam erupted as 600° pressurized vapor flashed seaater into more steam. Men in the engine room died instantly, either killed by the explosion or boiled alive by escaping steam.

The second shell struck amid ships, destroying Johnston’s aft engine completely and severing power to the rear half of the ship. Her speed dropped from 35 knots to 17 knots instantly. The third shell hit 2/3 down the ship, severing electrical power to three of her five 5-in gun turrets, leaving only the two forward mounts operational. Each 18.1 in projectile carried explosive force beyond comprehension for those who had never experienced battleship fire. The shells weighed 3,220 lb each and contained 73 lb of type 88 explosive.

They were designed to penetrate 16 in of armor plate at 20 m before detonating inside enemy battleships. Against Johnston’s unarmored hull, they punched completely through the thin steel plating before their delayed action fuses triggered detonation. This over penetration actually saved Johnston from immediate destruction. Had the shells detonated on impact, they would have blown the destroyer in half. But even over penetrating, the damage was catastrophic. Johnston’s after third was a twisted wreck of torn metal and flooding compartments.

Yamato’s secondary battery of 6.1in guns fired simultaneously with the main battery. Three 155 mm shells slammed into Johnston’s super structure with devastating effect. One shell hit a midship, destroying an anti-aircraft fire director and killing its crew. Two more struck forward, obliterating the torpedo director and tearing apart the bridge. The bridge became a slaughterhouse of steel splinters and body parts. Commander Evans was blown off his feet by the blast. two fingers of his left hand severed by a steel fragment.

His uniform shirt literally torn off his body by the concussion. His chest and face were peppered with small steel fragments. Much of his bridge crew was killed instantly. The navigator, Lieutenant Ed Degardi, lost part of his left hand to shrapnel. The helmsman was wounded but maintained his station, keeping the ship under control through instinct and training. The quartermaster was killed at his post. Blood covered every surface on what remained of the bridge. With power lost to three main gun turrets, steering control severed, engines crippled, and half his bridge crew dead or wounded, Johnston should have been finished.

Standard naval doctrine dictated that a destroyer suffering such damage should retreat immediately or face certain destruction. But Evans was not a standard officer, and Johnston’s crew was not a standard crew. Damage control parties worked with desperate efficiency, learned through endless training drills. Within 10 minutes, they had restored electrical power to the two forward gun turrets through emergency cables. They had reestablished steering control to the emergency station on the fan tail. Evans, despite severe wounds and significant blood loss, refused medical treatment beyond minimal field dressing to stop the bleeding.

“All medical supplies for wounded crew,” he ordered the ship’s doctor. “Save the medicine for men who need it more than I do.” Evans relocated his command from the shattered bridge to the Fantale, where manual steering was now being conducted. He shouted steering orders through an open hatch to sailors manually turning the rudder by hand, cranking the heavy mechanism that normally operated through hydraulic power. Johnston was still in the fight, reduced to 17 knots with three of five guns out of action.

With half her crew dead or wounded, she remained combat effective through the sheer determination of her crew and the leadership of a captain who refused to quit. Over the next two hours, Johnston would continue fighting, engaging target after target until Japanese shells finally sent her to the bottom. At this critical moment, USS Hull and USS Herman began their own torpedo runs, followed shortly by the four destroyer escorts. The converging attacks created chaos in the Japanese formation. Karita’s ships had been steaming in a cruising formation optimized for speed and mutual support, not for maneuvering combat.

The aggressive American attacks forced them to maneuver independently to avoid torpedoes, breaking up their coordinated fire plans and creating confusion in command and control. Japanese commanders had expected to steamroll the American carriers through overwhelming firepower. Instead, they found themselves dodging torpedoes, maneuvering to avoid collisions, and losing track of both enemy positions and their own ship’s locations in the smoke and rain. USS Hull, commanded by Commander Leon S. Kintberger, charged directly toward the Japanese battleships in the center of their formation.

At 0743, she launched a half salvo of five torpedoes at battleship Congo from 9,000 yd. The battleship turned hard to starboard to avoid the spreads, combing the torpedoes by presenting her narrow bow and allowing the weapons to pass harmlessly down her length. But the maneuver forced Congo to cease firing temporarily and took her out of position in the formation. At 0754, Hull fired her remaining five torpedoes at heavy cruiser Haguro from under 6,000 yds. Terrifyingly close in naval combat terms.

At least one torpedo struck Haguro in her engineering spaces, causing flooding and forcing the cruiser to reduce speed for damage control. But Hell paid a terrible price for her audacity. Japanese shells began hammering the destroyer as she made her approach. Over the next 45 minutes, Hell absorbed over 40 major caliber hits from battleship and cruiser guns. Her bridge was destroyed by an 8-in shell that killed most of the officers stationed there. Her forward engine room flooded from hits below the water line.

Her number two gun mount was blown off its foundation. All steering control was lost, forcing the ship to be conned from the emergency steering station aft. All power was lost when her remaining engine room flooded at 0830. With his ship dead in the water, listing heavily and sinking, Commander Kintburgger ordered abandoned ship. Hell rolled over onto her port side and sank stern first at 0855. Of her crew of 273 officers and men, only 86 survived. 187 died, either killed by shell hits, drowned when the ship sank, or taken by sharks during the two days survivors spent in the water awaiting rescue.

USS Herman, commanded by Commander Amos T. Haway executed perhaps the most daring single maneuver of the entire battle. At 0754, she launched her full spread of torpedoes at battleship Haruna from 4,400 yd, less than 2 1/2 m. The torpedoes missed as Haruna turned hard to avoid, but the battleship was forced to turn away from the carriers, taking her temporarily out of effective gun range. Moments later, Hman found herself trapped between two columns of Japanese heavy cruisers closing from different directions.

With suicidal courage and remarkable ship handling skill, Hatheraway steered Herman directly between battleship Congo and heavy cruiser Chukuma, crossing both ships boughs at pointblank range in a textbook cross of the T- maneuver executed in reverse. The Japanese ships faced with an American destroyer suddenly appearing directly between them at ranges of less than 5,000 yd were forced to turn hard to avoid collision. In doing so, they masked each other’s gunfire and lost track of Herman in the confusion.

Hman escaped the trap with damage from several near misses, but no direct hits, having forced two major Japanese units to break off their pursuit of the carriers. Her aggressive attack and brilliant seammanship had disrupted the Japanese formation at a critical moment. Throughout the battle, Herman continued engaging targets of opportunity. Her 5-in guns scoring hits on multiple cruisers, though causing relatively little damage against their armored hulls. The four destroyer escorts designed for anti-ubmarine warfare and never intended for surface combat against heavy ships followed the destroyers into battle after initial hesitation.

At 0742, Rear Admiral Sprag ordered the Little Wolves the radio call sign for destroyer escorts to attack. The initial order was somewhat ambiguous, and the destroyer escort commanders were unsure whether they were supposed to join the destroyer’s coordinated attack or conduct a separate attack. After several minutes of confusion, Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland of USS Samuel B. Roberts decided to act independently rather than wait for clarification. He ordered his ship to follow the destroyers into battle. Samuel B.

Roberts was the smallest of the small boys, displacing only 1,350 tons, fully loaded, about the size of a World War I destroyer. Copeland had pushed his ship beyond her design limits to keep pace with the larger destroyers, dangerously overpressuring her boilers to 660 lb per square in, well beyond the design limit of £440. The engineering crew maintained this pressure for over an hour, gambling that the boilers would not explode, coaxing 28.7 knots from a ship designed for maximum speed of 24 knots.

Black smoke poured from Roberts’s stack as her boilers strained beyond their design capacity. Before ordering his ship into battle, Copeland addressed his crew over the ship’s public address system with words that would become legendary in Navy law. This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can. The words were matter of fact, not dramatic. Copeland simply stated the tactical reality every man aboard already understood. They were charging toward heavy cruisers in a ship designed to fight submarines.

Their chances of survival were minimal, but their duty was clear. The carriers had to be protected regardless of cost. At 0810, Samuel B. Roberts launched her three Mark 15 torpedoes at heavy cruiser Chokai from approximately 4,000 yd, close enough that her 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns could engage Chokai’s superructure directly. Sailors manning the smaller weapons rad the cruiser’s upper works with automatic fire, shattering windows and killing exposed personnel. One torpedo struck Chokai’s stern engineering spaces, causing catastrophic damage to her propulsion system.

Combined with a 500 lb bomb hit from a Taffy 2 aircraft that detonated in her engine room minutes later, Chokai was left dead in the water with uncontrollable flooding. Destroyer Fujin Army later scuttled the crippled cruiser with torpedoes. Roberts had achieved what her designers never imagined possible. A destroyer escort had mission killed a heavy cruiser armed with 88 8-in guns. Roberts then engaged heavy cruiser Chikuma in an extended gun duel at ranges fluctuating between 5,000 and 7,000 yd.

Her two 5-in guns fired 608 rounds in 35 minutes, a sustained rate of fire of over 17 rounds per minute per gun. Astonishing for manually loaded weapons. The gun crews worked with machine-like precision, loading, firing, and loading again in a rhythm that never slowed despite Japanese shells exploding all around them. The aft gun mount designated Mount 52 was commanded by gunner’s mate thirdclass Paul Henry Carr, a 24year-old from Chakakota, Oklahoma. Carr’s gun crew maintained their incredible rate of fire even after losing electrical power to the mount, manually cranking the turret into position and handloading each 54lb shell into the brereech.

At approximately 0850, a Japanese 8-in shell struck Mount 52, penetrating the thin gunshield and exploding inside the mount. The blast killed or wounded most of the crew instantly, but the gun itself remained functional and Carr, though horribly wounded, refused to abandon his post. His gun continued firing. At 0851, disaster struck. A powder charge cooked off in the overheated brereech, detonating prematurely as it was being loaded. The explosion destroyed the gun mount completely, shattering the barrel and blowing the brereech mechanism apart.

Carr was caught directly in the blast, suffering catastrophic wounds described by witnesses as ripping him open from neck to groin. When rescue parties reached Mount 52 after the abandoned ship order, they found Carr dying at his station. still holding the mount’s final shell, begging with his last breaths for someone to load it so the gun could keep firing. He died moments later. Carr was postuously awarded the Silver Star for his actions. USS Carr FFG52, an Oliver Hazard Perryclass frigot commissioned in 1985, was named in his honor.

At 0851, an 8-in shell from Chuma penetrated Samuel B. Roberts below the water line, exploding in the forward engine room. The blast was catastrophic. The engine room was a confined space packed with high-press steam lines, fuel lines, and machinery. The explosion ruptured everything simultaneously. Steam at 600° scalded men to death instantly. Fuel oil ignited, creating an inferno. Water flooded in through the hole blown in the hull. The engine room became a death trap. Most personnel stationed there died within seconds.

The ship’s main engines and generators were destroyed. Samuel B. Roberts lost all power and began flooding rapidly. At 0909, a second shell struck near the aft 5-in mount, killing more men. At 9:10, with his ship dead in the water, flooding uncontrollably and sinking, Lieutenant Commander Copeland ordered abandon ship. Samuel B. Roberts capsized and sank at approximately 10:05. Of her crew of 224 officers and men, 89 were killed in action. An additional 25 died from wounds, exposure, or shark attacks during the twoday survivors spent in the water.

120 men ultimately survived, many bearing wounds and psychological scars they would carry for life. The destroyer escorts Dennis, John C. Butler, and Raymond conducted their own attacks, firing their limited torpedo loads at Japanese cruisers. While they scored no confirmed hits, their aggressive actions contributed materially to the chaos disrupting the Japanese formation. They also laid massive amounts of smoke, creating fog banks that degraded Japanese optical fire control and provided intermittent concealment for the carriers. The small boys had accomplished their mission.

Through sacrifice and audacity, they had disrupted the Japanese attack, bought time for the carriers, and sunk or damaged multiple enemy ships. But the cost was terrible, and their ordeal was far from over. Throughout these surface actions, American aircraft swarmed over the Japanese ships in continuous attacks that historians would later describe as some of the most courageous flying of the Pacific War. Taffy 3’s pilots faced an impossible situation. Their aircraft carried ordinance meant for ground targets, not naval armor.

Many Avengers had already expended their torpedoes on pre-dawn strikes against Japanese positions ashore. The Wildcat fighters carried machine guns effective against aircraft but useless against battleship armor. Some pilots attacked with depth charges, cylindrical weapons designed to explode underwater near submarines. Against surface ships, depth charges were nearly worthless, but pilots dropped them anyway, hoping to cause some damage or at least distract Japanese gunners. Yet the pilots pressed home attack after attack with courage bordering on insanity. Young ensons and left tenants, many with fewer than 200 hours of total flight time, dove on the most powerful battleships ever built.

They made run after run, attacking from different angles, some flying through walls of anti-aircraft fire so thick it seemed impossible to penetrate. When their bombs and torpedoes were gone, they made dry runs, diving at Japanese ships without weapons, forcing enemy commanders to maneuver and spoiling their gunnery. The psychological effect on Japanese commanders proved profound. Vice Admiral Kurita, watching wave after wave of American aircraft attacking his ships, became convinced he faced fleet carriers, not escort carriers. The ferocity and persistence of the air attacks seemed impossible from the small jeep carriers he had been briefed about.

The coordination between different squadrons suggested a much larger force. Pilots from Taffy 2 joined the battle as word spread. Rear Admiral Felix Stump commanding Taffy immediately ordered his squadrons rearmed with heavier weapons. Avengers were loaded with Mark13 torpedoes and 500 lb generalpurpose bombs. the heaviest ordinance available. Within 30 minutes of Sprag’s initial distress call, Taffy 2 launched strike after strike. Throughout the 90-minute surface battle, Taffy 2 launched three full strikes totaling over 70 sorties against Kurita’s force.

These attacks proved devastating. The concentrated air strikes sank three Japanese heavy cruisers and damaged others, disrupting Japanese command and control throughout the battle. At approximately 0820, aircraft from Taffy, two hit heavy cruiser Suzua with a near miss that detonated her starboard forward torpedo tubes. The type 93 Longance torpedoes, each carrying 1,080 lb of high explosive, detonated in a chain reaction. The explosions blew massive holes in Suzuya’s hull and started uncontrollable fires. The cruisers damage control parties fought desperately to contain the fires and flooding, but the damage was too severe.

Around noon, with fires raging out of control and ammunition beginning to cook off, Suzuya was abandoned. She sank at approximately 13:20. Heavy cruiser Chukuma, already damaged by Samuel B. Roberts’s gunfire, was hit by multiple torpedoes from Taffy 2 aircraft. The torpedoes opened her hull to the sea. Chukuma began sinking slowly, her crew abandoning ship as she settled lower in the water. Destroyer Noaki took aboard survivors before heading north to rejoin the fleet. Chikuma sank that afternoon. Heavy cruiser Chokai, dead in the water from Robert’s torpedo and the bomb hit to her engine room, was scuttled by Japanese destroyers with torpedo hits rather than leave her for American salvage.

The escort carriers themselves became direct targets as Japanese ships closed range despite the smoke screens and maneuvering. USS Gambia Bay, positioned on the port flank of the carrier formation, fell behind the other carriers as the chase continued. Her engines, stressed beyond their design limits, could not maintain the pace. Captain Walter VR Vueg, known as Bowser for his pugnacious personality, watched helplessly as the distance between his ship and the others gradually increased. By 0800, Gambia Bay had become isolated, a straggler separated from the protection of the formation.

At 0807, Japanese heavy cruisers Chikuma, Tone, and Haguro concentrated their fire on the struggling carrier from ranges of approximately 15,000 yds. Their 8-in shells began finding the range. At 0810, Chikuma’s shells hit Gambia Bay’s afterflight deck, starting fires. More hits followed in rapid succession. At 0820, a shell penetrated below the water line near the forward engine room, causing catastrophic flooding. The explosion opened the bulkhead between compartments, and seawater rushed in. The forward engine room flooded completely, killing most of the personnel stationed there.

Gambia Bay lost the use of one engine. Her speed dropped from 18 knots to 11 knots. She fell further behind, now isolated and defenseless. Johnston, despite her crippled condition, attempted to draw fire away from Gambia Bay. Commander Evans, still commanding from the Fantale, ordered his two remaining operational guns to engage the Japanese cruisers, hammering the carrier. Johnston’s shells struck Chukuma and Tone, causing minor damage, but forcing both cruisers to temporarily shift fire. But three cruisers firing from close range could not be deterred for long.

The cruiser’s shells continued to hammer Gambia Bay. Multiple hits struck her engine spaces, her hanger deck, her hull. Fires raged through the riddled carrier. At 0840, Gambia Bay was dead in the water, listing heavily to port with fires visible throughout her structure. At 0850, Captain Vueg ordered abandoned ship. The crew began going over the sides into the warm waters of the Philippine Sea. At 0907, Gambia Bay capsized to port. Her keel appeared above the surface, and survivors in the water could clearly see shell holes in her underwater hull.

The port propeller was missing, blown off by one of the hits. She remained floating inverted for only 4 minutes. At 911, USS Gambia Bay sank, disappearing beneath the surface in less than a minute. From first hit to final sinking, only 61 minutes had elapsed. She was the only American fleet or light carrier sunk by surface gunfire during World War II. Of her crew of approximately 800, 147 were killed immediately by shell hits or drowned when the ship sank.

Many more would die in the water over the following two days. Nearly 700 men went into the water as Gambia Bay sank. They would spend 50 hours floating in sharkinfested seas before rescue craft found them. The other carriers suffered heavy damage but remained afloat through desperate maneuvering, smoke screens, and the sacrificial attacks of their escorts. USS Kinen Bay was hit 15 times by shells ranging from 5 in to 14in caliber. One 14-in armor-piercing shell from Battleship Congo passed completely through the carrier from port to starboard without exploding.

The delayed action fuse failing to trigger. The massive projectile left holes 4 ft in diameter in both sides of the ship, but caused surprisingly little damage between entry and exit points. Had it exploded, Kinen Bay would have been destroyed instantly. Other hits killed and wounded crew members, started fires and caused flooding, but damage control parties contained the damage. Kinan Bay survived. USS White Planes sustained multiple near misses and at least one direct hit, but her crew kept her engines running and her steering functional.

USS Fanshaw Bay, Admiral Sprag’s flagship, dodged over 100 near misses through radical maneuvering personally directed by Sprag from the flag bridge. The Admiral’s calm voice over the radio, directing his task unit with steady commands, despite shells exploding around his ship, helped maintain morale throughout Taffy 3. The carrier’s single 5-in stern guns engaged Japanese cruisers whenever targets came within their 18,000yard maximum range. The little guns scored hits on several cruisers, causing minor damage to super structures, but nothing approaching critical damage against armored warships.

Nevertheless, the return fire forced Japanese ships to maneuver, contributing marginally to the general disruption of their attack. At approximately 0845, crippled and surrounded by Japanese destroyers, USS Johnston made her final heroic charge. Commander Evans had observed Japanese light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Isukazi, Yukazi, Urakazi, and Noaki forming up for a coordinated torpedo attack on the carriers. Despite having only one operational gun turret, one barely functional engine producing perhaps 10 knots, and steering controlled by men manually cranking the rudder, Evans turned Johnston toward the five enemy ships.

It was suicide, and every man aboard knew it, but the carriers had to be protected. Johnston’s remaining forward gun fired as fast as the crew could load, scoring hits on Yahagi with several shells. But Japanese destroyers quickly surrounded Johnston, pounding her with gunfire from pointblank range. Shells from 5-in guns ripped into the already battered destroyer from multiple directions. At 910, with all guns silenced, both engines destroyed, fires raging throughout the ship and the hull listing heavily from uncontrollable flooding, Commander Evans ordered abandon ship.

Men began going over the sides, jumping into the warm water and swimming away from the sinking destroyer as fast as they could. At 10:10, USS Johnston rolled over onto her port side and sank rapidly. As she went down, sailors on Japanese destroyer Yuki Kazi came on deck and stood at attention, saluting the sinking American destroyer in recognition of her crew’s extraordinary courage. The gesture captured in multiple Japanese accounts reflected the respect Johnston’s fight had earned even from her enemies.

Commander Ernest E. Evans was seen abandoning ship floating in a life jacket, but he was never recovered. Of Johnston’s crew of 327 officers and men, only 141 survived. 186 died, either killed in action, drowned when the ship sank, or taken by sharks during the long wait for rescue. Evans was postumously awarded the Medal of Honor, becoming the first Native American in the United States Navy to receive the nation’s highest decoration for valor. The citation read in part, “For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as

commanding officer of the USS Johnston in action against major units of the enemy Japanese fleet during the Battle of Sama. The first to lay a smoke screen and to open fire as an enemy task force rapidly approached, Commander Evans gallantly diverted the powerful blasts of hostile guns from the lightly armed and armored carriers under his protection, launching the first torpedo attack when the Johnston came under straddling Japanese shellfire. At 9:25, after nearly 2 and 1/2 hours of continuous combat, something miraculous occurred.

The Japanese attack faltered. Vice Admiral Karita, his command and control disrupted by aggressive American destroyer attacks, continuous air strikes, and confusion about what forces he actually faced, ordered his scattered ships to reform and regroup. Communications between Japanese ships had broken down during the chaotic running battle. Individual captains had been making independent decisions, chasing whatever target appeared closest. Rather than following a coordinated plan, Kurita feared he was facing the main American carrier force with heavy battleships nearby ready to trap his force.

At 9:25, he ordered a general retirement to the north to consolidate his scattered fleet. What Karita did not realize was that he had been on the verge of complete and total victory. The American destroyers were sunk or sinking. The destroyer escorts were out of torpedoes, low on ammunition, and critically damaged. The carriers were nearly out of fuel and ammunition. Gambia Bay was sinking. The others were damaged and slowing. Another 30 minutes of sustained attack would have destroyed Taffy 3 completely and left Lady Gulf’s invasion beaches utterly defenseless against Japanese battleship fire.

Instead, Karita withdrew. The decision remains controversial among historians eight decades later. Some argue Karita lost his nerve after nearly drowning when a targetgo was torpedoed. Others suggest he was simply too cautious, unable to accept casualties in pursuit of a decisive victory. Still others contend his decision was reasonable given the information available to him at the time. From the American perspective, the withdrawal seemed impossible to believe. Aboard USS Fanshaw Bay, a signalman standing near Admiral Sprag called out words that captured the surreal moment.

God damn it, boys. They’re getting away. Officers and crew members stared in disbelief as the massive Japanese battleships and cruisers turned northward and began steaming away from the carriers they had been on the verge of destroying. Sprag himself was incredulous. He had been absolutely certain his entire force would be annihilated. His afteraction report filed days later reflected his amazement at the outcome. The success of Taffy 3 was nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty. Sprag wrote, “Fleet Admiral Chester W.

Nimmits would later echo this sentiment in his official assessment of the battle, adding his own observation that Taffy 3’s survival defied all rational tactical analysis. But there was no time for relief or celebration. At 1050, even as Taffy 3 recovered from the surface action and rescued survivors from the water, a new threat appeared. Five Japanese aircraft approached at low altitude from the west, climbed to approximately 2,500 ft, then dove directly toward the carriers. These were not conventional attacks.

The pilots had no intention of pulling out of their dives. They were aiming their entire aircraft at American ships. The Divine Wind, the Kamicazi Special Attack Corps, was making its first organized appearance of the war. One Mitsubishi A6M0 fighter crashed into USS Kitkcon Bay’s port side near the waterline. Its bomb exploded on impact, blowing a hole in the carrier’s hull and causing flooding, but the damage was not fatal. Kitkun Bay’s crew controlled the flooding and kept the ship operational.

Another kamicazi targeted USS White Planes, but was destroyed by concentrated anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft exploded in midair and crashed into the sea short of its target, showering the carrier with debris, but causing no significant damage. USS St. Low was not as fortunate. At 1053, a Zero fighter piloted by Lieutenant Yukioki dove through heavy anti-aircraft fire and crashed through St. Low’s wooden flight deck near the center line. The aircraft’s 250 kg bomb detonated inside the hanger deck, igniting aviation gasoline and armed ordinance waiting to be loaded on aircraft.

Secondary explosions tore through the ship as bombs and torpedoes cooked off in the intense heat. Within minutes, flames consumed St. Low from stem to stern. The fires spread faster than damage control parties could contain them. At 11:25, with fires raging out of control and major explosions occurring every few minutes, Captain Francis McKenna ordered abandon ship, St. Low exploded in a massive fireball at 11:25 and sank within minutes. The first major American warship sunk by a kamicazi attack.

The psychological impact of the kamicazis would haunt American sailors for the remainder of the war. But in October 1944, the tactic was new and its full implications not yet understood. Taffy 3 had survived both the surface attack and the kamicazi strike, but the cost was staggering. Four ships sunk in combat. USS Johnston, USS Hull, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and USS Gambia Bay. The escort carrier USS St. Low sunk by kamicazi. Multiple other ships damaged, some severely. American casualties totaled 1,161 killed and missing, plus 913 wounded.

The survivors who abandoned ship spent up to 50 hours floating in the tropical waters of the Philippine Sea before rescue ships found them. Many men died from wounds, exposure, dehydration, or shark attack while awaiting rescue. The waters of Samar were known to be heavily populated with sharks, attracted by the warm water and abundant food sources. Survivors reported seeing sharks constantly during their time in the water. Some men simply disappeared, pulled under by predators. Others died from wounds that would have been survivable with immediate medical care, but proved fatal after hours in the water.

But Taffy 3 had accomplished its mission completely. The invasion beaches at Lady Gulf remained secure. General Douglas MacArthur’s 130,000 troops continued landing unopposed by naval gunfire. The Japanese center force, despite its overwhelming superiority and firepower, had been turned back without reaching its objective. Karita’s force continued north after breaking off the attack, hovering in the waters off Samar for several hours while attempting to regroup and assess damage. He changed course multiple times from due north to west to southwest and back to north again.

At approximately 1310 it became apparent to American observers that Kurita was heading away from Lady Gulf permanently. He transited back through San Bernardino Straight that night returning westward toward Brunai. American aircraft from Admiral Holsey’s fast carriers pursued and attacked the retreating Japanese force throughout the afternoon and evening of October 25th. Light cruiser Noshiro was sunk by air attack. Destroyer Hayashimo was damaged and had to be beached on the coast of Samar where she was later destroyed. Destroyer Noaki carrying survivors from heavy cruiser Chukuma ran into American cruisers USS Vincens, USS Miami, and USS Beloxy during the night transit through San Bernardino Straight.

The American cruisers crippled Noaki with gunfire and destroyer USS Owen finished her with torpedoes. Noaki sank with all hands, including the Chukuma survivors, over 1,200 men total. The battle of Lady Gulf as a whole was the largest naval battle in history measured by tonnage of ships engaged, geography covered, and strategic consequences. Over 200,000 personnel participated across an action area of approximately 100,000 square miles of ocean. The Japanese Navy deployed virtually every operational warship remaining in its inventory.

The Americans deployed major elements of both third and seventh fleets. The battle actually consisted of four separate major engagements fought over 4 days across 500 m of ocean. The battle of the Cibuan Sea on October 24th saw American carrier aircraft sink battleship Mousashi. The battle of Surria Strait on the night of October 24th to 25th saw American battleships annihilate the Japanese southern force in the last battleship versus battleship engagement in naval history. The battle of Capeano on October 25th saw Admiral Holse’s carriers sink all four of Azawa’s carriers and the battle of Samar on the morning of October 25th saw Taffy 3’s desperate stand against the center force.

The Japanese Navy lost 26 warships totaling 306,000 tons displacement. Three battleships were sunk. Mousashi in the Cibuan Sea and Yamashiro and Fusso at Surria Strait. Four carriers were sunk. Zuikaku, Zuiho, Chitosi, and Chioda at Capeano. 10 cruisers were sunk, including three at Sama. Nine destroyers were sunk. Over 10,500 Japanese sailors died in the 4-day battle. The Imperial Japanese Navy would never again sort as a major fleet. Fuel shortages, damage to surviving ships, and loss of trained personnel reduced the Navy to a defensive force incapable of strategic offensive operations.

The Americans lost six ships totaling 37,000 tons. Light carrier USS Princeton was sunk by a Japanese air attack on October 24th. Two escort carriers, USS Gambia Bay and USS St. Low were lost at Samar. Two destroyers, USS Johnston and USS Hull were sunk at Samar. One destroyer escort, USS Samuel B. Roberts, was sunk at Samar. American casualties totaled 2,83 killed and 913 wounded across all engagements. The strategic victory was complete and decisive. The Japanese Navy had gambled everything on Operation Shogo won and lost catastrophically.

The Battle of Samar, the centermost action of Lady Gulf, stands apart in naval history for its sheer improbability. Never before or since has such a mismatch in forces resulted in such an outcome. The mathematics were impossible to overcome through conventional analysis. Four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11 destroyers against six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. The tonnage ratio was approximately 10:1, favoring the Japanese. The gun power ratio was even more lopsided.

Yamato’s main battery alone could deliver more shell weight in a single salvo than all of Taffy3’s guns combined could fire in 5 minutes. Yet, the smaller force not only survived, but forced the larger force to withdraw without accomplishing its mission. How did this seemingly impossible result occur? Tactical analysis reveals multiple contributing factors, each necessary, but none sufficient alone to explain the outcome. First, the aggressive American destroyer attacks disrupted Japanese formation integrity at a critical moment. Kurita’s ships had been steaming in a formation optimized for fuel efficiency and mutual support during the approach, not for combat.

The sudden need to maneuver independently to avoid American torpedoes scattered the formation. Ships maneuvered without coordination, each captain making independent decisions. The result was chaos that degraded Japanese ability to mass fires effectively. Ships masked each other’s line of fire. Communications broke down as radio circuits became overloaded with conflicting reports and orders. Individual Japanese commanders lost track of both American positions and their own fleet dispositions. The smoke screens laid by American destroyers and destroyer escorts compounded this confusion, reducing visibility dramatically and degrading Japanese optical fire control systems that depended on clear sight lines to function effectively.

Second, American radar directed gunnery proved far superior to Japanese optical fire control systems in the conditions that prevailed off Samar. The Mark 37 fire control director linked to a Mark1A computer gave American destroyers the ability to generate accurate firing solutions continuously despite smoke, rain, rapidly changing ranges and violent maneuvering. Johnston, Hull, and Herman scored repeated hits on Japanese ships from ranges and in conditions where Japanese return fire struggled for accuracy. The technological edge partially offset the American disadvantage in gun caliber and ship size.

Japanese fire control depended primarily on optical rangefinders, sophisticated instruments that functioned superbly under ideal conditions, but degraded rapidly when visibility was reduced. The smoke and rain squalls of Samar created conditions where American radar gave a decisive advantage. Third, American damage control proved superior to Japanese practices, keeping American ships fighting longer despite critical damage. Johnston fought effectively for over 2 hours after losing half her propulsion, three of five gun mounts, and suffering flooding in multiple compartments. Kinan Bay survived 15 shell hits, including a 14-in projectile that passed completely through her.

The crew training emphasizing damage control combined with good compartmentation in American ship designs paid decisive dividends. Japanese damage control was less effective partly due to different design philosophies emphasizing offensive firepower over defensive survivability partly due to less emphasis on damage control training. When American destroyers hit Japanese cruisers, the damage often proved more severe than comparable damage to American ships. Fourth, Japanese armor-piercing shells designed to penetrate battleship armor over penetrated the thin hulls of American destroyers and escort carriers, reducing their destructive effect.

The armor-piercing projectiles were designed with delayed action fuses that triggered detonation after penetrating several inches of steel. Against battleship armor belts 8 to 16 in thick, this worked perfectly. Against destroyer hulls a fraction of an inch thick, the shells often passed completely through before detonating, reducing the damage they caused inside the ship. Had the Japanese been firing high explosive shells designed for unarmored targets with instantaneous fuses that detonated on contact, the damage to American ships would have been catastrophically worse.

Every hit would have torn massive holes in thin hullled ships. The fact that many Japanese shells overpenetrated was simply fortunate for the Americans. Fifth, American air attacks maintained continuous pressure throughout the battle, forcing Japanese ships to maneuver constantly and diverting attention from surface targets. Even after bombs and torpedoes were expended, pilots made dry runs to force Japanese ships to turn and maneuver, spoiling their gunnery solutions. The psychological pressure from continuous air attack, combined with Karita’s fear of facing more powerful American forces contributed significantly to his decision to withdraw.

Japanese anti-aircraft fire was heavy, but not overwhelmingly effective. American pilots pressed attacks with determination despite casualties. But the fundamental factor that explains Taffy3’s survival and victory was human courage and tactical audacity, executed with such ferocity that it convinced the enemy they faced a much more powerful force. Commander Ernest Evans charged toward Yamato without orders because he understood instinctively that aggressive action was the only chance for survival. Lieutenant Commander Robert Copeland took Samuel B. Roberts into battle against heavy cruisers, knowing survival was impossible, but attack was necessary.

Rear Admiral Clifton Sprag ordered his destroyers to conduct suicide torpedo runs because delaying the Japanese advance, even briefly, might save the carriers. These decisions were not made from positions of strength. They were made from desperation. But they were executed with such complete commitment and ferocity that they convinced Vice Admiral Karita he faced fleet carriers and heavy units rather than escort carriers and destroyers. The Japanese had been trained in Mahanian naval doctrine emphasizing decisive fleet actions between battleships.

They expected their opponents to maneuver cautiously, preserving strength for the climactic engagement. Weaker forces were supposed to retreat when confronted by superior strength, not attack suicidally. The American destroyers violated every assumption about how a weaker force should behave. They attacked with complete aggression. They closed to point blank range. They fought until their ships literally sank beneath them. This behavior was incomprehensible within the Japanese tactical framework. It caused confusion and uncertainty that contributed materially to Karita’s belief that he faced a much larger force than actually opposed him.

The aftermath of the battle produced immediate recognition of the extraordinary valor displayed by Taffy 3. The entire task unit was awarded the presidential unit citation, one of the highest unit decorations the United States can bestow. The citation praised the extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese fleet and noted specifically that two of the units valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point blank and expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group went down under the enemy’s heavy shells as a climax to two and one half hours of sustained and furious combat.

Commander Ernest Evans postumously received the Medal of Honor. His citation emphasized his role as the first to lay a smoke screen and to open fire, launching the first torpedo attack when Johnston came under straddling Japanese shellfire. The citation concluded that his valiant fighting spirit throughout this historic battle will venture as an inspiration to all who served with him. In 2023, 80 years after his death, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro officially confirmed that Evans was the first Native American in United States Navy history to receive the Medal of Honor.

Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland received the Navy Cross for his leadership of Samuel B. Roberts. Commander Leon S. Kintberger of Hull received aostumous Navy Cross. Commander Amos T. Haway of Herman received the Navy Cross for his ship’s aggressive actions. Dozens of silver stars and bronze stars were awarded to other officers and crew members. Many historians believe more medals of honor should have been awarded, but political considerations prevented it. The battle occurred partly because of a massive communication breakdown between Admiral Holsey and Admiral Conincaid.

Neither third fleet nor seventh fleet commanders wanted to draw excessive attention to a battle that revealed serious command and control problems at the highest levels. The human cost was staggering for such a short engagement. Of Johnston’s crew of 327, 186 died. Of crew of 273, 187 died. Of Samuel B. Roberts’s crew of 224, 89 died in action with an additional 25 dying from wounds or exposure afterward. Of Gambia Bay’s crew of approximately 800, 147 died immediately with more succumbing afterward.

Taffy 3’s total casualties exceeded 1,100 dead out of approximately 3,500 personnel engaged. The survivors who abandoned ship faced horror in the water that haunted them for the rest of their lives. Men clung to wreckage and life rafts for up to 50 hours before rescue ships arrived. The tropical sun beat down mercilessly. Dehydration became critical. Wounds attracted sharks. Men watched shipmates weaken and slip beneath the surface. Some survivors developed psychological trauma that manifested decades later as survivors guilt and post-traumatic stress.

But survival rates were higher than might be expected given the violence of the ship’s sinking. This reflected excellent training in abandoned ship procedures and adequate life-saving equipment. American ships carried sufficient life rafts and individual flotation devices. Crews were trained in survival procedures and practiced them regularly. When orders came to abandon ship, men executed those orders efficiently, even in the chaos of battle damage, fires, and flooding. The Navy’s emphasis on survival training, often derided by fleet sailors as make work, saved hundreds of lives off Samar.

The wreckage of the sunken ships remained lost for decades. The Philippine trench, where the battle occurred, features some of the deepest water in any ocean. depths exceed 20,000 ft in the area where Johnston Hull, Samuel B. Roberts, and Gambia Bay went down. Until very recently, the technology did not exist to explore such depths. In March 2021, explorer Victor Vesco located the wreck of USS Johnston at a depth of 21,180 ft using the deep submersible limiting factor. The wreck rests on an undersea slope, broken into sections, but largely intact.

Her bridge shows the damage from the 6.1 in shells that killed Commander Evans and much of his crew. Her stern section displays the catastrophic damage from Yamato’s 18.1 in shells. The discovery confirmed Johnston as the deepest shipwreck ever surveyed by a manned submersible, a record she held for 15 months. In June 2022, Visco’s team located USS Samuel B. Roberts at 22,621 ft, making her the deepest shipwreck ever discovered. The destroyer escort lies broken into two sections. The forward section rests upright on the seabed.

The aft section lies on its side about 10 m away. The break occurred at the point where the 8-in shell penetrated her engine room. the hit that ultimately sank her. Both wreck sites are protected under the sunken military craft act, designating them as war graves that cannot be disturbed. The remote locations and extreme depths provide natural protection. The ships will rest undisturbed as memorials to their crews. The story of the battle of Samar should never be forgotten.

It represents the finest traditions of naval service and the highest ideals of courage under fire. When tiny destroyers charged battleships head-on, they wrote a chapter in naval history that stands as testament to what can be achieved through determination, sacrifice, and an unwavering refusal to accept defeat even when defeat seems absolutely certain. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimttz’s assessment remains definitive. The success of Taffy 3 was nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty. Historian Samuel Elliot Morrison, the official historian of US naval operations in World War II, provided the most enduring tribute.